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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. Tm STATUTE OF Ln=ATiONs AND THE
DocTmmn OF "RELATIoN BACK"
One of the most controversial cases to be decided by the
supreme court during the survey period was Glenn v. E.I.
DuPont De Nemours and Company1 The plaintif's husband
died in July, 1961, as the result of injuries which arose out of
his employment with, Dunean Mills. After a recovery on
a workman's compensation claim, Mrs. Glenn was discharged as
her husband's administratrix. The present suit against DuPont
to recover damages for wrongful death was brought in January,
1967. Under section 10-19522 of the 1962 Code such an action can
be brought only in the name of the administrator or the executor
of the deceased's estate. In her complaint Mrs. Glenn alleged
that she was the "duly appointed administratrix of the estate of
her husband." On appeal there was no explanation by the
plaintiff as to why she was unaware that she was no longer
her husband's administratrix, but neither was there any indica-
tion that she had acted in bad faith. On the other hand, it
appears that the defendant knew of Mrs. Glenn's discharge.3
Rather than bring the point up at a time when it could be
remedied, that is, before the statute of limitations had run,
DuPont chose instead to demur to the complaint on other
grounds. This demurrer was overruled, and the decision of the
trial judge was affirmed on appeal.
4
Not until after the unsuccessful appeal and the running of
the statute of limitations did the defendant move to strike the
complaint on the ground that Mrs. Glenn was no longer her
husband's administratrix. Following this motion, Mrs. Glenn
sought to cure the defect by having herself appointed adminis-
tratrix de bonis nwn. The trial judge held that the complaint
could be amended so as to substitute Mrs. Glenn's present status
for that of the nonexistent administratrix. Furthermore, the
trial judge held that the appointment related back to the time
the suit was commenced, this fact saving it from being barred
by the statute of limitations. DuPont appealed.
1. 174 S.E2d 155 (S.C. 1970).
2. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10-1952 (1962).
3. 174 S.E2d at 160.
4. Glenn v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 250 S.C. 323, 157 S.E,2d 630
(1967).
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In a close decision (3-2) the supreme court reversed the trial
court's ruling. The court held that the action was commenced
only when the plaintiff was appointed administratrix de boni
non and that the "relation back" doctrine could not be used to
revitalize the prior suit.
After noting that Mrs. Glenn had no legal capacity to sue at
the time the action was brought, the court stated:
A civil action may be maintained only in the name of a
person in law, an entity, which the law of the forum
may recognize as capable of possessing and asserting
a right of action. A suit brought in a name which is
not a legal entity is a nullity and the action fails.5
Furthermore, the court held that the defect in the complaint
could not be cured because an action which in fact was a nullity
could not support an amendment. The court noted:
It is well settled that where an action is brought in the
name of a nonexisting plaintiff, an amendment of
complaint by substituting the proper party to the action
as plaintiff will be regarded as the institution of a new
action as regards the statute of limitations.(
In determining whether the plaintiff's case could be saved by
the doctrine of "relation back," the court relied heavily on the
Iowa case of Pearson v. Anthony.7 In that case the wife of the
decedent had filed a wrongful death action prior to being ap-
pointed administratrix. It appears that she expected to receive
the appointment in the future but had not secured the appoint-
ment because of a lack of funds. The court said that the acts
of a person pretending to be the administratrix were not effec-
5. 174 S.E.2d at 157-58.
6. Id., citing Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 57 (1949). It is interesting to note that
the dissent chides the majority for not having done its homework with respect
to this annotation. Justice Bussey declares:
The majority opinion contains a quote from 8 A.L.R.2d, at page
57, with reference to the substitution of a proper party for a
nonexistent party. Cited in support of such quotation is Pearson v.
Anthony, supra; a North Carolina case which has been overruled;
a Georgia case and two cases from Arkansas which are not at all
factually on point with the instant case. The Arkansas case of
McGraw v. Miller ... is much more nearly in point with the
instant case and there the court reached a result in accord with
the holding of the lower court in this case.
174 S.E.2d at 162. Furthermore, Bussey states that, had the majority read
the entire annotation, they would have discovered a generally liberal attitude
"on the part of the vast majority of the courts in this country, particularly in
the modem decisions, in allowing the substitution of a proper plaintiff for an
improper one, after the running of the statute of limitations .... " Id.
7. 218 Iowa 697, 254 N.W. 10 (1934).
[Vol. 22
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tive to commence an action and toll the running of the statute
of limitations, notwithstanding the fact that she was subse-
quently appointed administratrix.
In a lucid and often biting dissent," Justice Bussey indicates
that the majority's ruling is against the weight and trend of
modern authority. The real issue, the dissent points out, is
whether the defendant will be allowed to maneuver the plaintiff
into a position in which she is forced to institute a new action
that will be barred by the statute of limitations. If the defen-
dants knew from the beginning that Mrs. Glenn's action was a
nullity because of her failure to be appointed administratrix,
why did they not raise this point on their first demurrer and
appeal when there was still time to cure the defect? Justice
Bussey contends that DuPont's failure to raise the point on its
first appeal constituted a waiver9 and that they are now estopped
from asserting it. The dissent states:
Generally speaking, a party will not be permitted to
maintain inconsistent positions or to take positions in
regard to a matter which is directly contrary to or
inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at
least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowl-
edge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by this
action. This principal operates to preclude one who
prevents a thing from being done from availing him-
self of the nonperformance which he himself has oc-
casioned.10
The dissent next discussed and rejected the contention that,
when the plaintiff originated her action, she was a non-existing
legal entity:
Here Mrs. Glenn is a very much alive, existing person,
the widow of the deceased, entitled to letters of adminis-
tration, and a statutory beneficiary of the cause of
action. There is no question of her existence, the only
question being as to the capacity in which she instituted
the action."
In considering whether the doctrine of "relation back" should
be applied to save the present action from the statute of limi-
8. 174 S.E.2d at 159.
9. 174 S.E.2d at 160. See Jennings v. McGowan, 215 S.C. 404, 55 S.E.2d
522 (1949) ; Martin v. Fowler, 51 S.C. 164, 28 S.E. 312 (1897).
10. 174 S.E2d at 160, quoting from 28 Am. JuR. Estoppel & Waiver
§ 68 (1966) (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 161.
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tations, the dissent emphasized that there were South Carolina
decisions which have held that the subsequent appointment of
an administrator or executor relates back to the time of the
testator's or the intestate's death so as to validate those acts of
the representative which were beneficial to the estate. 12 In
Martin v. Fowler,18 a case involving two alleged administrators
who brought an action prior to qualifying for that position, the
court used the above reasoning as one of the grounds for
reaching a decision contrary to that reached in Glenn.
The dissent was not unmindful of the fact that the court's
holding in Glenn would tie South Carolina to a minority rule:
In the great majority of cases that have considered the
doctrine of relation back of the appointment of an
administrator as it might affect the running of the
statute of limitations, it has been held that such an
appointment made after the statute has run against a
claim will relate back to validate actions taken on the
claim within the statutory period by the person sub-
sequently appointed administrator, thus barring re-
liance upon the defense of limitations by the party
against whom the claim is asserted on behalf of the
estate. Such result has been reached in wrongful death
actions as well as other types of actions.14
Glenn is truly a textbook case in civil procedure. The court
was presented with a question of novel impression and there was
ample authority to support both sides. The litigants did not
give the court an easy way out by providing a "guilty party,"
for both sides were responsible for the situation in which they
found themselves. A procedural case like Glenn cannot be
decided by a mere matching of authority. In assessing the
holding one must ask what will be achieved, or what important
right will be vindicated by a decision of this type.
Does this decision advance the purpose of section 10-1952 of
the Wrongful Death Act? No. The only legitimate interest
that DuPont had in a properly appointed administratrix was
to assure that the matter would be res judicata and that they
would not be sued again on the same cause of action.15 An
amendment to the complaint would have satisfied this condition.
12. Martin v. Fowler, 51 S.C. 164, 28 S.E. 312 (1897); Cook v. Cook, 24
S.C. 204 (1885) ; Haselden v. Whitesides, 2 Strob. 353 (S.C. 1848) ; Walker v.
May, 2 Hill Eq. 22 (S.C. 1834); Witt v. Elmore, 2 Bailey 595 (S.C. 1832).
13. 51 S.C. 164, 28 S.E. 312 (1897).
14. 174 S.E.2d at 162, quoting from Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 1237 (1965).
15. Southern Ry. v. Moore, 158 S.C. 446, 155 S.. 740 (1930).
[Vol. 22
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The second question is whether the majority decision is neces-
sary to uphold the integrity of the statute of limitations. Once
again, the answer is no. The purpose of such a statute is to
insure that a person does not have to worry continually about
being sued on long dormant causes of action, and to make sure
that actions will be brought while they can still be effectively
defended. In Glenn the defendant had full notice of the suit
within the statutory time limit and took vigorous steps to
defend it. This decision does not protect the integrity of the
statute of limitations, but instead raises once again the question
of whether it is right to allow the statute to be used as a sword
as well as a shield.
Perhaps Justice Bussey best summarized the arguments
against the holding in Glenn when he stated, "In brief, the vast
majority of courts refuse to sacrifice substance to form and
thereby allow defendants to escape the consequences of a meri-
torious cause of action on mere technicalities." 6
II. VENUE
In Bouvy v. N.W. White & Co.Y the defendant appealed from
a ruling denying a motion for a change of venue. The plaintiffs
had brought the action in Lexington County pursuant to a
South Carolina statute which allows a motor carrier to be sued
in any county in which it operates."" The plaintiff's principal
place of business, the place of the accident, and the residence of
seven of the witnesses were, however, all located in adjoining
Richland County. The defendant's motion for a change of venue
was based on section 10-310 of the Code, which provides that
"[t]he court may change the place of trial . .. [w]hen the con-
venience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted
by the change."' 9 A motion of this type is addressed to the
discretion of the trial judge and, in order for it to be sustained,
one must prove that both the convenience of the witnesses and
the ends of justice would be served by the change.20
In affirming the decision of the trial judge, the court reviewed
the case of Utsey v. Charleston S. & N.R.?. 2' where the court
held that the ends of justice were better served by having the
16. 174 S.E.2d at 163.
17. 174 S.E.2d 347 (S.C. 1970).
18. S.C. CODE AxN. § 58-1470 (1962).
19. S.C. CoDE ANx. § 10-310(3) (1962).
20. Miller v. Miller, 248 S.C. 125, 149 S.E2d 336 (1966).
21. 38 S.C. 399, 17 S.E. 141 (1891).
1970]
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witnesses' testimony judged by jurors from their own locality.
This rule has never been accepted in other jurisdictions,22 but
there are a number of South Carolink cases which suggest that
the rule should be strictly applied when all of the material
witnesses are from the county to which removal is sought, or
none are from the county in which the action was instigated.
23
In Bouvy the court indicated that this doctrine should not be
applied so rigidly as to restrict the latitude of the trial judge
unduly. Citing Graham 'v. Beverly,24 the court stated:
Sound as may be the view that the credibility of a wit-
ness is best judged, and his testimony therefore best
evaluated, by a jury of his own county, its importance
to promote the 'ends of justice' must of necessity depend
upon many collateral factors .... [I]t is a matter ad-
dressed to the sound discretion of the judge who hears
the motion. It is not, in itself, a formula determinative
of that issue.
25
The defendant also argued that, since it had made a prima
facie showing and the plaintiff had made no contrary showing,
the trial judge abused his discretion in concluding that the
convenience of the witnesses would not be promoted by a change.
The supreme court, upholding the trial court's decision, stated
that the judge is not required to set aside his own experience and
knowledge and accept the conclusions of the affiants. In this
case it was proper for the judge to weigh his own knowledge of
the geography and conditions of the area against the arguments
made by the defendant.
Brockman v. Brockman,26 a divorce action, involved a situation
where a motion for change of venue was not a matter left to the
discretion of the trial judge. The defendant-appellant pre-
sented the court with an undisputed affidavit that he was a
resident of Spartanburg County, South Carolina, and moved for
a change of venue to that county. This motion was refused
without assigning any reason therefor.
Venue in divorce cases is set under section 20-106 of the Code,
the pertinent portion of which provides that "actions for divorce
from the bonds of matrimony shall be tried in the county ...
22. Annot, 74 A.L.R.2d 135 (1960).
23. E.g. Reynolds v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 217 S.C. 16, 59 S.E2d 344
(1950).
24. 235 S.C. 222, 110 S.E.2d 923 (1959).
25. Id. at 226-27, 110 S.E.2d at 925.
26. 253 S.C. 528, 171 S.E2d 862 (1970).
[Vol. 2
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in which the defendant resides at the time of the commencement
of the action .... ,27
The supreme court held that, where the residence of the de-
fendant was not in dispute, a motion for a change of venue to
that county was a question of law and was not addressed to the
discretion of the judge. The trial judge, therefore, had erred in
refusing to grant the appellant's motion for a change of venue
from Union to Spartanburg County.
Keller v. Bank of Orangeburg,28 a case of novel impression,
dealt with the problem of determining the residence of a cor-
porate executor for purposes of venue. The action was brought
in Calhoun County against the appellant bank as executor of the
estate of James A. Moss. The appellant bank had been appointed
executor in Orangeburg County; however, the suit was brought
in Calhoun County where it also maintained offices. The bank's
motion for a change of venue was denied.
On appeal the supreme court rejected the appellant's con-
tention that under section 10-30329 the residence. of a corporate
fiduciary should be restricted to the county in which it was
appointed and qualified as executor. The court pointed out that
West Virginia was the only state in which this rule had been
adopted by judicial decision rather than by a mandatory
statute. 30 The court thus followed the majority rules' that an
executor can be sued in the county in which he is a resident,
unless otherwise provided by statute. Therefore, the bank could
be sued in any county in which it maintained a place of business.
The bank had argued that, unless the minority rule was
adopted, a testator who selected a corporate executor would
subject his estate to suits in any county in which the corporation
had offices. The court admitted that there was some merit to
this argument, but emphasized that a corporate fiduciary was
protected from such a harsh result by the statute which allows a
change of venue in proper cases.
3 2
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-106 (1962).
28. 253 S.C. 66, 169 S.E.2d 99 (1969).
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-303 (1962).
30. Charlotton v. Gordan, 120 W. Va. 615, 200 S.E. 740 (1938); Charter
v. Doddridge County Bank, 119 W. Va. 735, 196 S.E. 158 (1938). Compare
Dowdy v. Franklin, 203 Va. 7, 121 S.E.2d 817 (1961).
31. 92 C.J.S. Venue § 58 (1955).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-310 (1962).
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M-T. TRTA
A. Mention of Insurance
In Walling v. Doe3 the trial judge in his instructions to the
jury read them the provisions of section 46-750.3434 of the Code
which relates to conditions for recovery under the uninsured
motorist provisions of an insurance policy; the trial judge told
the jurors that all of the conditions of the statute had been met.
The supreme court reversed and remanded the case on the
grounds that such an instruction left no doubt as to whether
there was uninsured motorist coverage which would pay any
judgment and that such an instruction was, therefore, prejudicial
to the defendant.
The effect of an inadvertent mention of insurance was dis-
cussed in Keller v. Pearce-Young-Angel Co. 35 At the trial the
plaintiff's brother, while testifying as to his own losses from
property damage, mentioned the fact that he had talked with an
adjuster for the defendant's insurance carrier. On appeal the
court held that the trial judge's refusal to grant a mistrial was
not an abuse of discretion. The court indicated that it was
inclined to agree with the trial judge's statement that "nearly
everybody has got insurance." The court pointed out that, al-
though this was no excuse or justification for intentionally
injecting the issue of insurance coverage into a trial, this factor
should be considered in determining the possibility of prejudice
when insurance coverage is inadvertently mentioned. The court,
citing Horsford v. Carolina Glass Company,8 stated that the
proper remedy for accidental reference to insurance was to
have the remark stricken from the record and the jury charged
to disregard the testimony.
B. Instructions to the Jury
In Long v. Gibbs Auto Wrecking Company" the court upheld
jury instructions given by the trial judge to the effect that "if
a party fails to produce the testimony of an available witness or
to explain his absence as a witness on a material issue, it may be
inferred by the jury that his testimony, if presented, would be
33. 253 S.C. 427, 171 S.E2d 494 (1969).
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.34 (Supp. 1969).
35. 253 S.C. 395, 171 S.E2d 352 (1969).
36. 92 S.C. 236, 75 S.E. 533 (1912). Justice Bussey refers to this case as
"[t]he parent case in South Carolina on the admissibility of evidence with
reference to insurance." 253 S.C. at 399, 171 S.E2d at 354.
37. 253 S.C. 370, 171 S.E2d 155 (1969).
[Vol. 2
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adverse to the party who fails to call the witness."3 8 Although
evidence was presented to show that the missing witness was
in Florida on business, the court decided that this was not
sufficient to prevent the trial judge from instructing the jury
that they could draw an adverse presumption from the witnesses
absence. The court noted that, although the witness was out of
the state, there was no showing that he could not have arranged
to be present.
The appellant in Quality Concrete Producots, Inc. v. Thoma-
sonP9 argued that the trial judge had erred in refusing to instruct
the jury to the effect that the respondent had abandoned its
contract with the appellant and, therefore, should not be allowed
to recover. The ruling of the trial judge was upheld on the
grounds that such a request constituted a charge on the facts
and was prohibited by the constitution. The court also ex-
plained that instructions to the jury should be confined to
issues raised by the pleadings and supported by the evidence.
In this case there was no evidence from which it could be con-
cluded that the respondent had abandoned its contract with the
appellant.
IV. RES JUDICATA
Res judicata and estoppel by judgment are two doctrines
which are closely related and often confused. Both are intended
to save the courts and the parties from repeated litigation in-
volving the same subject matter. The doctrine of res judicata
holds that there cannot be more than one suit between the same
parties on the same cause of action.40 On the other hand,
estoppel by judgment is concerned with obtaining a final adjudi-
cation of a factual issue as opposed to a final adjudication of a
cause of action.
4 '
In Jones v. Hamm, 42 the first of this year's cases involving
these two doctrines, the court merely summarized the elements
necessary for the application of estoppel by judgment. The
court stated:
It is hornbook law that a prior judgment of a court
having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject mat-
ter is conclusive in any subsequent action between the
38. Id. at 377, 171 S.E2d at 158.
39. 253 S.C. 579, 172 S.E2d 297 (1970).
40. BLAci's LAW DicTioNAIRY 1470 (4th ed. 1951).
41. Id. at 650, 981.
42. 253 S.C. 283, 170 S.E2d 206 (1969).
19701
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same parties, or their privies, of all questions which
were actually litigated in the prior action and deter-
mined by the judgment, regardless of whether the sub-
sequent action involves the same or a different cause
of action.43
The second case, Carolina Equipment & Parts Co. v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co.,4 4 deals with both the doctrine of res judicata
and the doctrine of estoppel by judgment. The plaintiff sued a
subcontractor for rent on highway building equipment and
sued the Continental Casualty Company as the holder of the
performance bond for the work. The plaintiff obtained a judg-
ment against the contractor but lost its suit against the insurance
company. The president of the equipment company testified that
he had seen the rented machinery being used on the job. The
insurance company, however, was able to prove that it was not
the bonding agent for that particular stretch of highway con-
struction.
The plaintiff-equipment company then brought a second suit
for the same rents, but this time alleged that the equipment had
been used on a stretch of highway construction which was
bonded by Continental. Continental pleaded (1) res judicata
and (2) estoppel but was overruled by the trial judge. On appeal
a divided court upheld the trial court's decision. As to the first
issue the majority dismissed Continental's plea of res judicata
by pointing out that the suit was brought on a different bond
from the bond in the first case. Therefore, the suit was based on
a new cause of action and not precluded by the doctrine of res
judicata.
On the second point the insurance company argued that the
first suit had finally determined that the equipment was used on
another project and that the plaintiff was now estopped by that
judgment from pleading otherwise. The majority, however, held
that the only issue decided at the first trial was that the plaintiff
had sued on the wrong performance bond. The court pointed out
that, when the president of the equipment company testified in
the first trial, he was unaware that the subcontractor he was
suing was actually working under two separate construction
contracts. The court stated:
We perceive of no reason to hold that Carolina is
estopped to prosecute this action. Mr. Stevens made an
43. Id. at 285, 170 S.E2d at 207.
44. 253 S.C. 129, 169 S.E.2d 379 (1969).
[Vol. 22
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honest mistake in his testimony at the first trial as to
docket numbers ... but the substance of his testimony
as to what he saw and did was the same at both
trials .... 45
The dissent argued that the case should have been reversed
on the grounds of estoppel. Justice Littlejohn pointed out that
"Carolina Equipment finds itself in the very uncomfortable
position of having convinced two separate Dorchester County
juries of facts which are irreconcilable." 46 In summarizing his
position, Justice Littlejohn contended:
In judicial proceedings, fairness to one's adversary re-
quires that at some point a party be bound by a factual
position he has formerly taken before the court. The
salutary effects of and the necessity for a rule binding
a party at some point to his chosen factual position
are present whether the position was maintained hon-
estly or dishonestly, carefully or negligently. The cost
and expense of litigation and the vexation to the party
sued is the same regardless of the cause. 47
V. JuISDICTION AND PROCESS
In Parklands, Inc. v. GibsonAl4 two of the defendants objected
on the grounds that personal service of process in Texas was not
sufficient to bring them within the jurisdiction of the court.
The suit arose as the result of extensive and confusing trust
litigation which had taken place in Texas. The plaintiffs in
Parklands were stakeholders in lands and funds which were
involved in the Texas litigation. Because of the number of
conflicting claims, the plaintiffs sought a court order which
would safely allow them to pay out the funds and transfer the
property.
Under section 10-455 personal service of process on out of
state defendants is the equivalent of service by publication.49
The question before the court was, therefore, whether the de-
fendants could be served with process by publication. If so,
then personal service would also be effective to establish juris-
diction. The pertinent statute, section 10-451,50 provides that
45. Id. at 135, 169 S.E2d at 381.
46. Id. at 144, 169 S.E2d at 386.
47. Id.
48. 253 S.C. 367, 170 S.E2d 669 (1969).
49. S.C. CoDn A x. § 10-455 (1962).
50. S.C. CoDn Axx. § 10-451 (1962).
1970]
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service by publication may be had "when the subject of the
action is real or personal property in this state and the de-
fendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent,
therein or the relief demanded consists wholly or in part in
excluding the defendant from any interest or lien therein." 51
The trial court, sustaining the defendant's objection on juris-
dictional grounds concluded that the subject of the action was not
land in South Carolina, but certain contracts and agreements
made in Texas. The supreme court, in reversing this ruling,
held that the subject of the action was real and personal property
in the state. Process could, therefore, be served either by pub-
lication under section 10_45152 or by equivalent personal service
under section 10-455. 53
Section 15-235 of the South Carolina Code54 provides that,
whenever a judicial circuit is without a resident judge, juris-
diction in all matters arising in that circuit may be exercised
by the judge of the adjoining circuit. In DuPont V. DuPontr5
divorce proceedings were transferred to the fourteenth circuit
while the resident judge of the fifteenth circuit was on vacation.
The question raised on appeal was whether or not the adjoining
circuit judge could retain jurisdiction after the return of the
resident judge. The supreme court held that jurisdiction could
not be retained. The court concluded, "The exercise of juris-
diction at chambers by the judge of an adjoining circuit is
permissible only when the statutory condition is met, i.e., the
circuit in which the matter arises is without a resident or pre-
siding judge by reason of absence or otherwise."5 6
The pitfalls of section 10-633 of the Code, 57 which provides for
the service of a summons without a complaint, were illustrated
by Rochester v. HoZliday Magic, Inc.58 The statute provides that
if the complaint does not accompany the summons, then
the summons must state where the complaint is or will
be filed, and if the defendant, within twenty days
thereafter, causes notice of appearance to be given and,
in person or by attorney, demands in writing a copy of
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10455 (1962).
54. S.C. CODS ANN. § 15-235 (1962).
55. 253 S.C. 591, 172 S.E2d 372 (1970).
56. Id. at 594, 172 S.E.2d at 374.
57. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10-633 (1962).
58. 253 S.C. 147, 169 S.E2d 387 (1969).
[Vol. 22
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the complaint, specifying the place within the state
where it may be served, a copy thereof must within
twenty days thereafter be served accordingly.
5 9
Although the Rochester court did not directly discuss the
inherent fairness of that statute, the case does dramatically
emphasize how confusing and potentially dangerous this law
can be for the unwary and unfamiliar.
While visiting South Carolina, an officer of the defendant
corporation was served with a summons without complaint. The
summons, which was on a printed form, indicated, "[y]ou are
hereby summoned and required to answer the complaint in this
action a copy of which is herewith served upon you ...."
However, under the heading "SMIIONS AND NOTICE"
were typed the words "(COMPLAINT NOT SERVED)." In
short, the Summons contained the impossible assertion that the
complaint was both served and not served. The general counsel
for Holiday Magic forwarded this confusing document to a
North Carolina attorney who was handling other business for
the company.
At this point the proper procedure would have been for the
defendant to have demanded a copy of the complaint. Instead,
the attorney wrote to both the clerk of court and to the plain-
tiff's lawyers, indicated that he had no complaint to answer,
and requested advice as to the South Carolina procedure in the
matter. He also asked that further action be withheld until he
notified the plaintiff's attorney. Both the clerk and the plain-
tiff's attorney received the letter, but neither replied. The clerk,
of course, knew nothing about the affair as the complaint was
not filed until over four months after the summons was served,
nor was he under any legal duty to investigate the matter. Since
there was no file in which the letter could be placed, it was set
aside by the clerk and eventually mislaid.
Only after a default judgment had been entered and over one
year later did the defendant receive a response to his inquiry.
At that time the plaintiff's attorney wrote the defendant's at-
torney and informed him that Holiday Magic owed his client one
quarter of a million dollars! Despite the fact that Holiday
Magic had been remiss in failing to retain a South Carolina
lawyer, the supreme court, which recognized the inherent in-
justice in the situation, reversed the default judgment and
directed that time be given to answer.
59. S.C. CoDE ANx. § 10-633 (1962).
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This case indicates what a. trap the summons without com-
plaint can be for the unwary defendant. If the statute can be a
trap for attorneys, as in this case, one can imagine what its
effect on a layman must be. What of the layman who, upon
receiving the summons, checks with the clerk of court, but is
told by the clerk that he has no complaint and knows nothing
about the matter? Under the circumstances it would not be
unreasonable for him to decide that the proper course of action
would be to go home and wait for the complaint to be served, or
even to conclude that his adversary had decided not to sue.
Either decision could be fatal, since the plaintiff does not have
to serve the complaint until he receives a demand in writing, and
the defendant must make that demand within twenty days of the
service of summons.
Perhaps the legislature should take a hard look at section
10-633. The summons without complaint should not be abolished,
but should be improved so as to protect the rights of both the
plaintiff and the defendant more adequately. The statute, as
presently written, is obviously designed for the convenience of
plaintiffs' attorneys, since it allows them to institute actions
quickly without having to take the time to draw up a complaint.
This advantage could be very valuable in cases where process
must be served on a defendant who is about to leave the juris-
diction, or where the statute of limitations is about to run.
These are valid objectives which should and can be retained
in any revision. The main problem with the statute is that it
serves as a trap for the careless or unknowing defendant. This
fault could be eliminated by placing on the plaintiff the burden
of supplying the defendant a copy of the complaint. Perhaps
the statute could be revised so that the plaintiff cannot obtain
a default judgment until he has served the defendant (either
personally or through publication) with a copy of the complaint.
VI. DEFAULT JUDGMENT
In Livingston v. South Carolina Farmn Bureau Mutual In-
surance Co."° the court refused to give leave to the insurer to
plead after it had taken a default judgment. The summons and
complaint were delivered to the Insurance Commissioner in
compliance with section 37-10561 of the South Carolina Code
of Laws and forwarded by him to Farm Bureau on the same day.
60. 174 S.E.2d 163 (S.C. 1970).
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-105 (1962).
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The appellant did not respond to the complaint within the
twenty day period required by statute, 2 and a default judgment
was entered. Prior to the default judgment, but after the twenty
day period, the appellant moved, on the grounds of excusable
neglect, for an order permitting it to file an answer to the
complaint. The insurance company explained that the papers
had come into the hands of a clerk who did not know of their
importance and had not been brought to the company's atten-
tion until it was too late to file an answer. The. trial court re-
fused this motion.
A motion of this type is directed to the discretion of the trial
court under section 10-609 of the code. This section provides that
"[tlhe court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as may
be just, allow an answer or reply to be made or other act to be
done after the time limited by this Code or by an order enlarge
such time."(13
The supreme court held that the trial judge had not abused his
discretion in refusing the order, because the appellant had
failed to show excusable neglect. The court stated that the
insurance company had merely shown neglect without an excuse
and that this was not sufficient grounds for granting the motion.
Rochester v. Holiday Magic, Ih. 6" and Edwards v. Ferguson5
dealt with the issue of whether the trial judge had abused his
discretion in refusing to vacate default judgments granted pur-
suant to section 10-12136( of the Code. Although the fact situa-
tions in these cases differed, the holdings were virtually identical.
The court noted that, in order to vacate a judgment under the
statute, there must be a showing that the judgment was taken
by the defendant as a result of his mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise, or excusable neglect and that the defendant had a prima
facie meritorious defense. The court held that, if these two
requirements are met, the judgment should be vacated and the
defendant permitted to answer. In both the above cases, the
court agreed with the appellants and concluded that the trial
court had abused its discretion in refusing to grant the relief
sought.
Rochester involved a default judgment taken as a result of the
defendant's failure to comply with South Carolina's summons
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-641 (1962).
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-609 (1962).
64. 253 S.C. 147, 169 S.E2d 387 (1969).
65. Smith's Adv. Sht No. 19 (Jun. 13, 1970).
66. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10-1213 (1962).
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without complaint statute and has been dealt with at length
elsewhere in this article. In Edwards an automobile liability
insurance carrier appealed from a default judgment taken as
the result of the failure of its insured to give the company timely
notice of both the pending action and the accident itself. Not
only did the insured wait fourteen months before notifying the
insurance company of the accident, but it also appeared that
there may have been collusion between the plaintiff and the
defendant. In both opinions the court pointed out that section
10-1213 "should be liberally construed to see that justice is
promoted and to strive for disposition of cases on their merits. 687
In considering whether the ends of justice would be served by
vacating the judgment in Edwards, the court even took judicial
notice of the fact that the insurance company was required by
law to issue the defendant an assigned risk policy and that under
the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act the company could
not cancel the policy because of acts of the insured in violation
of its provisions. It is true that the integrity of procedural rules
must be preserved; however, one cannot read Rochester and
Edwards without being convinced that the ends of justice were
best served by a liberal interpretation of this statute.
VII. TRmiL By JuRy
In NAorwood v. Bryant6 the court held that compulsory ref-
erence to a master in equity was not proper where the subject
of the action was a dispute as to the boundary line between two
adjoining pieces of property. The court pointed out that, when-
ever there is an issue as to title to real property, under section
10-109660 of the Code the parties are entitled to have a jury
weigh the facts, unless they specifically waive this right.
VII. JO0 -DR
The circumstances under which causes of action may be joined
in the same complaint are briefly reviewed in Gantt v. C.I.T.
Credit Corporation.70 This was a case involving joinder of
causes of action for slander, invasion of privacy, and conversion,
all arising out of the defendant's attempts to collect a debt
owed by the plaintiff's husband.
67. Edwards v. Ferguson, Smith's Adv. Sht. No. 19 (Jum. 13, 1970);
Rochester v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 253 S.C. at 152, 169 S.E2d at 390.
68. 253 S.C. 551, 172 S.E2d 108 (1970).
69. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1056 (1962).
70. 173 S.E.2d 658 (S.C. 1970).
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Section 10-70171 of the Code allows several causes of action
(whether legal, equitable, or both) to be united in one complaint
where they arise out of "the same transaction or transactions
connected with the same subject of action." The purpose of the
statute is to avoid unnecessary suits and to help eliminate con-
gested court dockets and long delays before trial. The court
explained that joinder should be permitted "when the causes of
action are reasonably connected by the coincidence of time, place
and circumstances, where the causes of action are materially
allied in substance and interrelated, and where the development
of the actions tells a connected story."
72
IX. PLEADiNGS
In Funderhurke V. Johnson73 a case involving an automobile
accident, the court upheld the action of the trial judge striking
from the defendant's answer the defense that the accident was
caused by the sole negligence of a third party. Part of Circuit
Court Rule 18 states that "[i]n all cases of more than one ...
defense... each shall be separately stated and numbered
.... 1"74 The court held, however, that the issue of sole negli-
gence was covered by the defendant's general denial and that
to list the defense separately and to number it would make it
erroneously appear that it was a separate defense. The court
concluded that it was within the discretion, if it was not the
duty, of the trial judge to strike the defense from the de-
fendant's answer.
In his dissent7" Justice Bussey admitted that the issue of sole
negligence of a third party could be raised under a general denial
but contended that there was neither authority nor reason why
such a defense could not be separately pleaded. To the contrary,
he stated that
I am . . .convinced that it is good practice to plead
such matter. There are, indeed, cases in which . . .a
defendant should be required to plead such in order to
avoid surprise to the plaintiff and to prevent delay
in the administration of justice .. . .The plaintiff can
never suffer prejudice as a result of having been ad-
vised of the alleged fault of a third party, ... but to
71. S.C. CODa Axx. § 10-701(1) (1962).
72. 173 S.E2d at 661.
73. 253 S.C. 430, 171 S.E2d 597 (1969).
74. Cnm CT. R. 18.
75. 253 S.C. at 433, 171 S.E2d at 598.
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the contrary, is benefited by knowing fully any de-
fenses of the defendant.
76
In the second case in this area, Still v. Hampton. and Branch-
ville Railroad,77 the court held that a person injured by the
tortious acts of another has only one cause of action for actual
and punitive damages. The court warned that one should not
confuse the cause of action with the type of damages sought.
X. MISCELLANOUs
In 0"r v. Saylor" in a well documented dissent,79 Acting
Associate Justice Wade S. Weatherford, Jr., reviews the history
of the doctrine of res ipsa loguitur in South Carolina and urges
its adoption as a. rule of evidence. The majority refused to
consider the rule at this particular time, but did state:
Perhaps, in an appropriate case, we should do so and
consider whether we have heretofore, while denying the
rule by name, followed it in substance in applying the
circumstantial evidence rule. We are not however con-
vinced that this case is factually appropriate for this
purpose. Furthermore, we have not been requested
to re-examine our position on this appeal, and the issue
has not been briefed by counsel.8 0
Goleman v. Daniel81 was an action by a creditor to set aside a
conveyance of real estate on the grounds that it was fraudulently
made for the purpose of avoiding two judgments. In their
answer the defendants alleged that the judgments were based on
notes which were obtained through subterfuge and misrepre-
sentation. In sustaining the plaintiff's demurrer, the supreme
court held that this answer was not a defense to the fraudulent
conveyance action but was actually a collateral attack on the
judgments. The court pointed out that a judgment could not be
collaterally attacked, unless it was "'void on its face, or upon an
inspection of the judgment roll' ".
Finally, the supreme court amended Rule 8 of the Rule of
Disciplinary Procedure for Attorneys.82 This rule deals with
76. 253 S.C. at 435 171 S.E.2d at 599.
77. 253 S.C. 62, 169 S.E.2d 97 (1969).
78. 253 S.C. 155, 169 S.E.2d 396 (1969).
79. Id. at 159, 169 S.E2d at 398.
80. Id. at 158-59, 169 S.E.2d at 397.
81. 253 S.C. 363, 170 S.E.2d 665 (1969).
82. RULE or Disc. PRoc. R. 8, as amended, Smith's Adv. Sht. No. 19 (Jun.
13, 1970).
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the manner of filing a complaint with the Secretary of the
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline. Added
to the rule was a paragraph which states that the resident judge
for the accused attorney shall be provided with a copy of the
complaint and the answer and also that the Secretary shall
notify the resident judge of the disposition made by the Board
of Commissioners. The amendment also provides that these
communications shall be confidential except as between the
resident judge and the presiding judge of the circuit or any
county judge within the circuit.
MAi L. ARc m
19
Archer: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons,
